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GREAT BRITAIN
AND
THE UNITED STATES
A Critical Review of
THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS

BY


J. TRAVIS MILLS, M.A.

STAFF-LECTURER IN HISTORY TO THE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION
SOCIETIES OF OXFORD, CAMBRIDGE, AND LONDON

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FROM AMERICA TO BRITAIN

'All Europe in our blood, but yours our vision, our speech,
our soul!'

ELIZABETH TOWNSEND SMITH.

FROM BRITAIN TO AMERICA, DECEMBER 1917

'And not more beautiful upon the mountains
Were ever yet the feet of him that brought
Glad tidings than your prow upon the sea.'

From *Americans, Hail!*

SIR WILLIAM WATSON.

PREFACE

THE lectures from which extracts are here printed were delivered to various units of the American Army of Occupation in Germany during the months of May and June of 1919. Their sole object was that of promoting conciliation born of mutual understanding.


It was natural, and indeed inevitable, that an Englishman speaking to Americans should emphasize for the purpose of explanation the British point of view in respect particularly of the original, and in its consequences most important, of all the family disputes between the two great English-speaking commonwealths.

For the knowledge that Britain's policy was logically defensible, however unwise her action, that there does exist a British 'case', is yet, despite the honest and impartial statements of modern American historians, to a large extent hidden from many minds on either side of the Atlantic.

In this sense then, and in this sense only, can the following pages be termed British propaganda. To set forth the truth of History has been my earnest aim on which side soever that truth might tell.

My cordial thanks are especially due to Mr. J. A. R. Marriott, M.P., and to Mr. W. F. Reddaway, not only for help derived from their lectures and published writings, but for their kindness in reading my manuscript, and for not a few valuable suggestions and emendations.

J. T. M.



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Great Britain and the United States

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS

‘COMPREHENSION must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship.’ So said President Wilson in a speech delivered at Mobile, Alabama, in October of 1913; and it is because I firmly believe in the truth of this dictum that I embark upon what may at first sight appear to you a rash and presumptuous task.

But there are more reasons than one which may sustain an Englishman when he ventures to speak to an American audience upon the historic relations between their country and his own. In the first place he knows well that Americans love fair play—the ‘square deal’, as Theodore Roosevelt would have said, for every class and every nation too. And in the second place it is now almost unanimously admitted by the historical professors and students of the United States that until lately full justice has not been done to the English side in the matter of our family disputes.

For the first hundred years of its history the United States had never fought against any European country except England. England was the hereditary enemy. Patriotism was taught at her expense. Embroidered narratives of our defeats, and of the heroism of those who fought against us, formed the stock-in-trade of American school books. Fourth of July orations fanned

the flames. Irish agitators recounted the tale of their woes, and politicians pandered to the frequently all-important Irish vote. In recent years, indeed, the secular bitterness between the two countries showed signs of rapid diminution and might well have died away, had it not been sustained and envenomed by German propaganda. The late Mr. Page, your ambassador at St. James's and a good friend of both countries, made reference in a speech at Plymouth to the international mischief wrought by the fallacious teaching to which I have referred.

'On the American side', the Ambassador was glad to say, 'the disproportion and wrong temper of these books is fast disappearing. Newer texts are correcting this old fault.' It is very gratifying to me to be in a position whole-heartedly to confirm the truth of this statement from my unvarying experience in your colleges and schools during a lecture tour in the Eastern States. That was ten years ago. Since then there has been a rapid growth of historic fairness and, shall I say, of magnanimity and generosity both in England and America.

Nowadays historians on either side of the water vie with each other in their attempts to achieve a perfect impartiality of treatment and in laudable endeavour to discern the point of view of an honourable opponent. Indeed, Dr. Channing of Harvard goes so far as to charge British historians—Lecky and Sir George Trevelyan—with unfairness to the statesmen who mismanaged American affairs during the mid-eighteenth century in 'requiring of them the standards of our day and not of their own time'. Many of your great men—Washington, Lincoln, Lee, Roosevelt, Longfellow, Whittier, receive as full a measure of admiration in Great Britain as ever they did in their own land. Some of their names are

canonized in the hearts of Englishmen. The majority of thoughtful and instructed citizens of the old country are in full sympathy with the conceptions underlying your noble constitution no less than with the ideals, for which in these critical times you, in common with ourselves and our allies, have stood and stand. Sharing these views without qualification or reserve, I can with a clear conscience request you, if by chance a comment of mine does not meet with your individual acceptance, to postpone your final judgement until the close of my lectures.

Let us then consider in turn some of the great outstanding historic causes of disagreement between our two countries, and try in a spirit of impartiality and of reconciliation, as between friends and not enemies, to discover whether it may not be possible that in certain cases the secular bitterness has been due rather to mutual misconception than to conscious injustice, and whether in other cases the fault on either side has been such and so great as really to be unforgivable by a magnanimous nation.

And, first, with respect to the chief quarrel and foundation of all the rest—that which led to the separation of the colonies from the mother country. Why did the Americans rebel? What was the true cause of the schism in Greater Britain?

There is a sentence written by a famous English historian the truth of which is now undisputed by every competent student whether in England or America. The late Mr. Lecky, when describing the colonial policy of the Grenville administration of 1763-6, states that the Prime Minister 'resolved to enforce strictly the trade laws, to establish permanently in America a portion of the British army, and to raise by parliamentary taxation of America at least a part of the money which was

necessary for its support. These three measures', declares Lecky, 'produced the American Revolution.'

But this statement of admitted fact is not an explanation. Obscurities are not removed, they are scarcely indicated by the term taxation, by the mere repetition of those magic syllables 'The Stamp Act'. Three millions of otherwise contented people do not rebel by reason of material grievances so infinitesimally small as those involved in Stamp Act or Tea Duty. The duty on tea was, indeed, not so much an act of oppression as 'of relief'—substituting as it did a duty of 3d. in the pound payable in the colonies in place of 12d. in the pound hitherto levied in England. Moreover, by a statute of George II all tea exported to America was relieved from the heavy inland duties still charged in the mother country. The people of America, in short, paid 3s. a pound for precisely the same quality of tea which the English drank at 6s. Nor when we have echoed the ancient and bogus cry of 'No taxation without representation' have we advanced one whit nearer to the solution of our problem. These things are superficial or deliberately invented to suit the occasion; we must probe much deeper if we would come to the root of the matter.

It is difficult to embrace in any simple formula the complicated causes of strife. Factors economic, geographic, and constitutional combined to produce the catastrophe. No single one, and perhaps no single group, would have sufficed. Psychological no less than material causes inflamed the minds of the colonists. There is in the first place no doubt at all that what is known by the name of the 'old Colonial system' has much to answer for, based as it was on the then universally accepted Mercantile Theory whose object and justification was national wealth and national power. The

commercial interest of any individual or section of the community was subordinated to that of the whole. The western nations of Europe, indeed, were too apt to regard their possessions oversea as so many estates to be farmed not so much for the benefit of the whole empire as for that of the mother country. But England may rightly claim to be an honourable exception to this rule.

For generations before the American revolt the British mercantile system, so far, at any rate, as the colonies were concerned, had assumed the form of a body of commercial regulations conceived in the general interest of the imperial commonwealth. Each section, in whatever continent it might be placed, contributed in the way best suited by reason of its geographical position or of the products of its soil and climate to the common good. Of course, if the interest of the mother country directly clashed with that of some particular colony, the colony had to give way. That this should be so was not merely to the advantage of Great Britain, but it might well be argued that in the long run such an arrangement would tend to strengthen the whole of that already vast empire of which Great Britain was the heart and the head. But rarely, however, did definite hardship fail to be balanced by corresponding benefit. If, for example, the American colonists were forbidden to sell their tobacco and naval stores outside the limits of the British dominions, Englishmen, on the other hand, were permitted to buy such tobacco only as came from America. Direct encouragement by means of bounties was given to the importation of naval stores. A market for the staple products of the colonies was therefore secure. Again, the regulation which forbade the colonies to receive goods from Europe except

through England was no piece of petty selfish tyranny on the part of the mother country. It was prompted by a desire to encourage shipping, and thus to confer a benefit not on England only but in scarcely less a degree on the outlying portions of the empire. For only by such means as this could adequate provision be made for those stout vessels and hardy sailors, the most essential factors in the common defence. Furthermore, direct material compensation was granted for the restrictions thus placed upon colonial trade, inasmuch as European goods going through England to the colonies were almost entirely freed from duties with which otherwise they would have been chargeable; so that the colonist not infrequently paid less for these very commodities than did the Englishman himself.

But the restrictive regulation which caused most friction, and proved indeed the immediate source of much of the discontent which culminated in the Revolution, concerned the colonial trade with the French West Indies (1733). The New England colonies in particular found in those islands their readiest and most lucrative market for the fish and timber which they bartered for molasses and sugar. It is said that without this trade the timber of New England would have rotted on the ground and, what was perhaps of equal importance in a country which had not then 'gone dry', her flourishing distilleries would have ceased to be.

This enactment was issued, be it understood, not in the private interests of Great Britain, but at the request of her sugar colonies who suffered from the competition of the French. It concealed no intentional unfairness to the American. But when the regulation was made it was ignored, defied.

The attitude of the home government if weak was

not unsympathetic. They were not prepared to offend the West Indian planters by rescinding the decree, but they made little effort for many years to enforce the law and to suppress the vast operations of the irregular trade. Doubtless the New England states regarded themselves as the victims of injustice, but, owing to the circumstances just named, the grievance, if indeed it deserved the name, was by no means intolerable. But when, a generation after the original enactment, it was proposed to make the restrictive edict not nominal only but real, and in addition to impose upon the colonies a tax for the establishment and maintenance of an army in America, the torch was lit and the train fired which ere long was to splinter into fragments the proud edifice of imperial unity.

Just where are we to look for the final and surpassing provocation? In what did it consist? No reasonable and impartial mind can find it in the amount of the new assessment. 'The old colonial system', writes Professor Howard of Nebraska, 'was in no way the result of conscious oppression'; and this statement is every whit as true of the end as of the beginning or of any intermediate stage in the long story of our imperial connexion with America. Assuredly, the new restrictions were galling, but they were, as usual, to a large extent balanced by new and most valuable concessions, which in this instance took the form of bounties on flax and hemp, freedom to export rice, the abolition of duties upon the whale fishery of New England.¹

¹ In general support of the views expressed in the text the reader's attention may be called to some significant sentences in Adam Smith's famous and epoch-making book published in the very year of the Declaration of Independence. 'In the disposal of their surplus produce', writes Smith (*Wealth of Nations*, Book iv,

The taxation of the American colonies even under the new regulations was still light, and in no way comparable to the financial burden which the people at home were called upon to bear. No free, industrious, thrifty, and peace-loving people will deliberately incur the dangers and horrors of war without cause or causes which at least appear to themselves imperative and otherwise irremediable.

But in our search for such causes it is necessary to note that during the interval between the original Molasses Act of 1733 and the Sugar Act of 1764 important and far-reaching events had entirely changed the political conditions of North America. Few need to be informed that there was a time when the enterprise and statesmanship of our rivals of France, now, and we trust for ever, our excellent friends, appeared to promise for their trans-Atlantic colonies a permanence more assured, and an extent and prosperity far transcending all that the most sanguine Imperialist could venture to prophesy for one narrow line of sparsely-peopled territory between the Appalachians and the sea. You know how the fiercely contested hundred years' struggle between

ch. vii), 'the English colonies have been more favoured, and have been allowed a more extensive market than those of any other European nation. . . . With regard to the importation of goods from Europe, England has likewise dealt more liberally with her colonies than any other nation. . . . Great Britain, too, as she confines to her own market some of the most important productions of the colonies, so in compensation she gives to some of them an advantage in that market. . . . Though the policy of Great Britain with regard to the trade of her colonies has been dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other nations, it has, however, upon the whole, been less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of them.'

These are noteworthy admissions on the part of the most redoubtable opponent of the Mercantile System.

England and France for predominance in the New World was finally decided by Wolfe's immortal and daring exploit on the cliffs above Quebec. But the consequences of the great triumph alone concern us here. By the Peace of Paris in 1763 vast territories were transferred from the French to the British flag. With the growth of Empire an adequate scheme, long advisable, of organization and of defence became an urgent necessity. All this was apparent alike to the able, brilliant, but youthful, inexperienced, and impulsive Charles Townshend, and to George Grenville, the industrious and conscientious legalist whose very merits precipitated the crisis, for they were the slaves of a narrow if masculine understanding. Grenville was incapable of adapting his statesmanship to the exigences of a changing time. That long training which had made him a master of the routine and technique of office not unnaturally led him to base his plans upon the supposition that the methods and circumstances of established order were certain to continue. A fanatic of immediate duty, with little sympathy and less prescience, he could not project himself into the mind of his opponents or perceive that on occasion a lesser duty must give place to a higher.

Such men were supported by their king. It would seem, indeed, that secular tradition is borne out by fact, and that, so far as the old country is concerned, the immediate responsibility for the schism in Greater Britain must be placed at the door of King George III. Like Grenville, and indeed like the vast majority of the English statesmen of that day, the king was incapable of broad views, but he was by no means lacking in political talent. An ex-prime-minister has styled him 'the ablest political strategist of his day'. He was fascinating in manner, genial, witty, courageous, indus-

trious, frugal: but he had been trained in a bad school. 'George, be King', that was the advice which his mother so frequently and so superfluously offered him in his youth. And king he determined to be. Imbued by his mother with all the claims and instincts fostered by that theory of Divine Right, cherished until a much later day by the kings and princelets of Germany, even his English tutors had not greatly modified the maternal teaching. For they had chosen for their text-book a famous treatise, not without many merits both of philosophy and of style, Bolingbroke's *Patriot King*. But they seem to have neglected all the author's warnings, to have ignored the salutary limitations which he placed upon the sovereign's action, and to have emphasized only the desirability of wresting power from the representatives of party and restoring to the Crown a paramount influence in national affairs. Throughout the long American struggle the king, with an obstinate courage which would have been pronounced wholly admirable had it been exercised in a better cause, refused voluntarily to concede one jot or tittle of the royal prerogative or of the national claims which he conceived it his duty to defend. Every plan of conciliation, whether Chatham's or Burke's or Lord North's, was wrecked at some stage or other upon the rock of the king's stubborn and impracticable pride. So much an Englishman can say by way of criticism without unduly straining his conscience.

But it is mere justice to add that considerations not of sentiment only, but of sober and forcible argument may be brought forward on behalf of the monarch and his ministers. When, after the war was over, King George, who was without doubt a great gentleman, received John Adams, the first American Minister to the Court of St. James's, it was with marked kindness and,

indeed, magnanimity:—‘I not only receive with pleasure’, he said, ‘the assurance of the friendly disposition of the United States, but I am very glad the choice has fallen upon you to be their Minister. I wish you, Sir, to believe and that it may be understood in America that I have done nothing in the late contest but what I thought myself indispensably bound to do by the duty which I owe to my people.’ All this was as generous as it was certainly true. When we think of it and of the tragedy of the king’s old age we cannot but feel that recent events have added new and undreamt of force to the eloquent appeal of a great English writer, ‘Oh, brothers,’ said Thackeray to those who heard him first in America, ‘Oh, brothers! speaking our own dear mother tongue—Oh, comrades! enemies no more, let us take a mournful hand together as we stand by this royal corpse, and call a truce to battle.’

But to return to our narrative. We have seen that the defeat of France and the annexation of Canada forced upon Great Britain mighty problems with which the autonomous colonies, strongly individualistic, hating each other with a genuine, hearty, constant, and ever-renewed detestation, were quite incompetent to deal. Their loyalty to England was by no means universal or fervid but, said Benjamin Franklin in 1766, ‘They all love England much more than they love one another.’ Only fear of France had so far linked the colonies together and to the motherland. Our enemies perceived what was hidden from the vast majority of our own statesmen. Vergennes, Montcalm, each predicted with singular accuracy the course of events. ‘England’, said Vergennes, ‘will soon repent of having removed the only check which would keep her colonies in awe. . . . She will call on them to contribute towards supporting

the burdens they have helped to bring upon her, and they will answer by striking off all dependence.' This, in brief, is precisely what happened. Hitherto no colony had been asked to contribute to the cost of the general imperial defence. The burden of the responsibility had been shouldered by Great Britain. Inter-colonial jealousy and division was such as to inhibit any concerted and coherent policy not only with respect to France but to the ever-threatening Indian danger. When the Seven Years' War approached, the British Government under the spur of necessity made a valiant attempt to promote colonial union. A congress met at Albany in 1754, and although the delegates unanimously decided that 'a union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their preservation', and proceeded under the guidance of Franklin to draft a plan of union, no sooner was the proposal brought before the colonial assemblies than one and all of them, influenced by particularism or by the equally selfish consideration that what the colonies failed to do would perforce be done by the mother country, refused to accept it. The circumstance was deplored by Franklin, by Dinwiddie the governor of Virginia, and by many others who had at heart the true interests of the colonies. But lamentations were vain. The danger was urgent. As the colonies would not defend themselves, Great Britain sent over Braddock and his four regiments 'to save the situation'. The expedition it is true was not successful, but its expense in men and money was borne by the British taxpayer. During the progress of the war, Britain continued to bear a great proportion of the cost of colonial defence. After the treaty of peace had been signed in 1763 it seems certain that the English troops alone saved the northern and central colonies from annihilation at the hands of the

Indian Confederation under Pontiac. Great Britain once more appealed to the colonies to provide men and means to protect their own frontiers. Again her invitation was ignored or declined. Virginia alone responded to the call with energy and good will. But an army was obviously essential for American defence. Britain, crushed by heavy taxation, the direct result of the French war, could no longer bear the burden unaided. The colonists would not voluntarily contribute their share. What was to be done? This was Britain's dilemma. She had tried in vain, aided by the best brains of America, to induce the colonies to form a union and levy their own taxation. There seemed only one course left—for the British Government to raise the necessary funds on its own authority. Hence Grenville's action. Hence the Sugar Bill and the Stamp Act. 'Considering', said Grenville to the protesting American agents, 'the whole circumstances of the mother country and the colonies, the latter can and ought to pay something to the public cause. I know of no better way than that now pursuing, to lay such a tax. If you can tell of a better, I will adopt it.' Franklin urged that the demand for money should be made in the ancient way to the Assembly of each particular province. 'Can you agree', asked Grenville, 'on the proportion each colony should raise?' They could not. Grenville, in this matter at least, must be acquitted of undue obstinacy. The possibilities of the situation were exhausted.

But, you may say, what would have happened if America had been represented in a common Parliament? Would not this have solved every difficulty? The theory of the British Constitution at that time was, as Burke said at Bristol, that every member of Parliament represented not one particular constituency only, but

the nation and the Empire. Of course, the theory might or might not be wise, but the plea that it was based on fact has much to support it, and in its operations it was not unequal. If Massachusetts was not directly represented at Westminster, no more was Manchester. But both, according to the British view, were virtually represented. If it be pleaded that no British Parliament would long ignore the public opinion of the great unrepresented masses at their very doors, it can at least be said that if eloquent advocacy could promote a cause, the interests of America lost nothing by the championship of Burke and Chatham.

Despite 'represented ruins and unrepresented cities' it may be urged that, at any rate, no county or large district in Britain was totally deprived of a direct voice in national or imperial legislation, whereas America sent no single person across the sea to speak for her in Parliament. True: distance and time made this impracticable, so at least thought Edmund Burke, but in compensation the colonies had long exercised an almost complete control of their internal affairs. That is the gist of the whole American argument. Just here lies the source of the radical misunderstanding between the mother country and her colonies. 'Taxation without representation', says a modern American historian, 'was an excuse rather than the cause of the Révolution. . . . It will not do to inquire too closely into the reasons which they (the colonists) gave in the excitement of the struggle.'¹ Although Franklin and Otis may be quoted to the contrary, Americans did not desire representation in the Imperial Parliament. If Britain should unfortunately resolve at any time upon a policy disagreeable to the colonists, America was astute enough to be fully

¹ *v. The Development of the United States*, Max Farrand, pp. 34-5.

aware that the presence of her few representatives would not suffice to turn the scale. Tradition dies hard. There are still people who believe that Americans in this matter were the single-minded champions of a sacred doctrine. Further proof to the contrary need scarcely be adduced than the fact that when Governor Pownall advocated in England a scheme of colonial representation, the idea found no favour in any colony and was promptly tabooed, but it is perhaps of equal significance that during the War of Independence, and in the years immediately following, the colonial democracies were no more willing to submit to taxation from their own general Congress than they had been from a British Parliament.

The colonies for generations had been left to rule themselves. With the single exception of the trade laws, in which they acquiesced, they enjoyed a practically untrammelled freedom. Long prescription had but strengthened their belief that this liberty was a right and not a privilege merely. The descendants of men who went out from England in order to worship God in the way which seemed best to them were likely to cherish a love of independence. Remoteness from Britain, the free life of a new land, the nature of political institutions in a country where Parliaments were apt to 'break out' of themselves, all these and many other circumstances sustained and developed this admirable, if somewhat haughty and truculent, spirit of freedom. Americans had long been their own masters ; they meant to remain so. It was, in short, the sovereignty of the British Parliament to which they objected. This was their fundamental grievance. The colonies claimed absolute equality with Great Britain. According to the American view, the British Parliament had no more right to interfere

with the internal affairs of Massachusetts than the General Court of Massachusetts had with England. One is irresistibly reminded, though I would not press the parallel too closely, of a similar statement made by some of our countrymen 1200 years before. That modest confidence which distinguishes the Welsh to-day was honestly inherited from their fathers. 'If', said one of their early kings, 'the Cymry believe all that Rome believes, that is as strong a reason for Rome obeying us as for us obeying Rome.'

It is, I believe, now admitted with scarcely a dissentient voice that legally and constitutionally the British were within their rights in thus attempting to tax the colonies. Moreover, they were prompted not by insular selfishness, but by the laudable wish to benefit the whole Empire, and to broaden and strengthen its foundations. To the great majority of people in the old country the action of the colonists appeared merely in the light of a petty piece of arrogant provincial particularism—the unwillingness or incapacity to think imperially.

But there were a few Englishmen who looked at the question from a different standpoint, who were bold enough and magnanimous enough to ignore all questions of law or even of right, and to 'pardon something to the spirit of liberty'; who meant to secure peace; and who were well aware that 'peace implied conciliation'. 'It is not', cried Burke, 'what a lawyer tells me I may do, but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do. . . . What signify titles and arms? Of what avail are they when the reason of the thing tells me that the assertion of my title is the loss of my suit? . . . I am not determining a point of law, I am restoring tranquillity.' Burke, therefore, clearly perceiving the wide difference which had so long existed between the principles of the

constitution and its application in practice to American affairs urgently argued on the ground of expediency for a return to the ancient conditions. 'Leave America to tax herself. I am not going into the distinctions of rights. . . . I hate the very sound of them. Leave the Americans as they anciently stood. . . . Be content to bind America by laws of trade ; you have always done it. . . . Do not burden them by taxes ; you were used not to do so : let this be your reason for not taxing. These are the arguments of States and Kingdoms. Leave the rest to the schools.' Contemned, almost ignored, at the moment of their expression, these maxims of wisdom were enforced and illustrated by the American war and its results. England learnt her lesson. That she has been aided at the crisis of her fate by the voluntary action of each individual dominion in the world-wide Empire which she has founded, is due above and beyond all else to one grand and fundamental cause, that, in respect not of India only but of every section of the English-speaking commonwealth, she has adopted and continuously pursued the principles and policy laid down by Edmund Burke in his speeches on America.

I am not about to enter upon any narrative of the various acts of supreme un wisdom on both sides which gradually year by year fanned the flame of discontent, and culminated in the framing of the Declaration of Independence and in the outbreak of war. I am concerned only with the main issues. But it would manifestly be unfair to the American cause to ignore the fact that, in addition to fundamental considerations such as those we have discussed, there were other and perhaps more easily understood causes of disaffection, causes to which, as it seems to me, has seldom been attached the importance they deserve.

There was one ardently desired possession, which may be said to have been the ultimate goal of the political and economic aspirations of the American colonists—the great hinterland which stretched from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi. A most unwise proclamation of George III, dated October 7, 1763, had reserved this territory as Crown domain and had expressly forbidden the colonists to settle or trade on it. The Quebec Act of 1774, which constituted the Ohio valley the boundary of the former French province of Canada, was no more acceptable from the point of view of all the colonies from Connecticut to Virginia, and the two acts together were the death-blow to all hope of expansion.

The evil results of these statutes lived after them. But at least it may be pleaded that their purposes were entirely misunderstood. So much is acknowledged by American historians now, and was, even then, admitted by their best informed and most intellectual leaders. Professor Howard, in the volume which he contributes to the well-known and excellent *American Nation* series, frankly admits, even with respect to the Proclamation of 1763, that it was 'a temporary expedient for securing the rights and quietening the minds of the Indians', and that 'there was no intention of placing a permanent restraint on westward settlement'. Such was the deliberate assertion of George Grenville and the belief of Franklin and Washington. But the second act proved a far greater grievance than the first. During the eleven years' interval men's minds had become inflamed. What might have been permissible in 1763 was intolerable in 1774. The authors of the Declaration of Independence roundly condemned the Quebec Act as intended for the purpose of 'establishing arbitrary government in a neighbouring province and enlarging

its boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies'. But four generations later the eminent American historian just quoted can say of this same measure that 'it expressed the honest efforts of British statesmen to solve the difficult problem of governing the Dominion taken from France in 1763'. 'None of the colonies had a good claim to the western lands included within the borders of the new province. . . . There was no design to establish arbitrary government in Canada or to attack the liberties of the other colonies.' Again, Mr. Howard, adopting the view of an earlier writer, asserts that the extension of the boundaries of Quebec to the Ohio and Mississippi 'was prompted not by invidious designs against the other colonies' but by no motive less praiseworthy than that of putting an end to 'the steadily increasing anarchical character of the conditions in these regions'.¹

This is, I believe, a perfectly just and accurate statement. But I would suggest to you that the real, though not the ostensible, cause of American indignation was neither the introduction of 'despotic government', by which opprobrious term the partial institution of the French system of law and administration was described, and still less the establishment of the Roman Catholic religion within the limits of the enlarged province, but precisely this—that by the Quebec Act bounds were set upon the natural and legitimate enterprise and ambition of the leading American colonies.

Here again, as in respect of constitutional problems, it is fair to state that we are dealing not with a question of right but of expediency. The right of the sovereign to grant vacant lands west of the mountains to any one

¹ v. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, chs. xiii-xv.

he pleased was never contested by the colonies before the Declaration of Independence, and was, in fact, expressly conceded by their representative statesmen.¹

When we pass on to another branch of our subject and reflect upon the causes to which the colonial victory is traditionally assigned, we find ourselves at once plunged into a grotesque region of twisted truth and romantic exaggeration. Colonial gasconades outrival those of D'Artagnan or Cyrano de Bergerac; just as the horrors for which the British are held responsible compare, in kind if not in magnitude, with the deeds of Alva or the Armenian atrocities. We must at once admit that the behaviour of the German mercenaries enlisted by Britain was bad, and their employment in her service most provocative and tactless; the practices of Indian warfare were cruel and revolting; but neither side scrupled to employ Indians, and there appears no reasonable doubt that in so far as the War of Independence is concerned the initiative was taken by the colonists.

No one wishes to discount the many instances of real heroism and notable achievement on the part of Americans, whether individuals or armies. Their deeds are known to you, their names are treasured by a grateful people. But it is necessary if our aim is truth, even approximate truth, that we should recognize divisions and draw distinctions. The loyalists were numerous. New York and Pennsylvania, according to John Adams, 'were so nearly divided that if New England on one side and Virginia on the other had not kept them in awe they would have joined the British'. In some states—South Carolina and Georgia, for example—the 'Tories', as the loyalists were styled, found themselves in a large

¹ v. Howard, pp. 233-4.

majority. In every state they were numerous. This was not to be wondered at 'when it is recollected', as Chief Justice Marshall said, 'that no practical oppression had been generally experienced'. The revolution appears to have been the work of a small, but energetic, and skilfully organized minority, who gradually, as the war progressed, succeeded in manœuvring the indifferent mass of citizens into a position from which there could be no withdrawal.

Nor can it truthfully be said that the colonial armies were made up of heroes and patriots. Washington's most ardent and most numerous recruits were Ulstermen—that is perhaps worth remembering in these days. They formed a very large proportion of the army which fought at Yorktown. But for the rest their leader long found eulogy difficult: 'Such a dearth of public spirit, such want of virtue, such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts . . . I never saw before, and pray God's mercy I may never see again. . . . Could I have foreseen what I have experienced . . . no consideration on earth should have induced me to accept this command.' 'It grieves me to see so little of that patriotic spirit which I was taught to believe was characteristic of this people.' Such quotations might readily be multiplied. To what miracle, then, are we to attribute the American success? Above and beyond all else to two essential factors—the first was Washington's character, the second was French help. Now do not suppose that I am about to indulge in any elaborate and quite superfluous panegyric of Washington. You are yourselves sometimes, I dare say, a little tired of hearing Aristides called 'The Just'. I am not going to tell you that Washington told no lies. It will relieve your minds, if you are not aware of the fact already, to know that he did, despite all assurances

to the contrary. Indeed, Sir George Trevelyan, an ardent admirer of the man and his cause, goes so far as to say that when Washington 'deemed it incumbent upon him to practise deception he showed capabilities and aptitudes which placed him on a level with the most famous masters in the higher branches of the art'. But when I contrast the grand and simple character of Washington with that of a too common type of the public man—whether British or American—of his day, governed by motives of personal spite and personal gain, I am inclined to quote one sentence from the work of a living American writer. In Mr. Winston Churchill's brilliant and delightful *Richard Carvel*, the hero of the story, an old man, thus speaks to his grandchildren, 'There are some few men in the world, thank God for it, who bear their value in their countenance: who stand unmistakably for qualities which command respect and admiration and love. We seem to recognize such men and wonder where we have seen them before. In reality we recognize the virtues they represent. So it was with him I saw in front of me, and by his air and carriage I marked him then and there as a man born to great things. You all know his face, my dears, and I pray God it may live in the sight of those who come after you for generation upon generation.'

But it is natural for an Englishman to query, What after all did Washington achieve in war? Sometimes, indeed I am inclined to think that not all Americans are aware of the precise nature of the service rendered. For no dazzling record of victories, few brilliant manœuvres, are associated with his name. Washington's first duty was to drill, discipline, organize, provide munitions and food. Like Oliver Cromwell he may be said to have created his own army. I have merely hinted at the

formidable nature of the difficulties which confronted him. The distrust felt by each and every American state of a strong Central Government, their prejudice against a standing army, the necessity for obtaining the double consent of Congress and of state before a delinquent could be punished, before recruits or money could be obtained, such were some of the ever-recurring obstacles which only tact, patience, valour, an indomitable spirit, and a disinterestedness without parallel could suffice even in measure to smooth away.

Washington had at least as much to fear from his friends as from his enemies. Fortunately for the general and his cause those enemies were slow and half-hearted in action. Their leaders, in particular the brothers Howe, felt much sympathy for their opponents; they hoped to the end for reconciliation; they dreaded a victory almost as much as a defeat; they gave Washington invaluable time. But there is a limit to human endurance. All their leader's great qualities would in the long run have availed America little. In despair she turned to Europe. 'The intervention of France saved the cause.' That was decisive. England's desertion of her Allies at Utrecht, and again at the Peace of 1763, had not been forgotten. We had not a single friend on the Continent. France chafed under the Treaty of 1763. And now the American revolt gave her the longed-for opportunity of revenge. Moreover, she saw commercial advantages in the opening up of American markets, in the possible conquest of the rich West Indian islands. The writings of her philosophers, of Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau, had made their countrymen eager to promote what seemed to them the cause of political and religious liberty.

And French designs were aided by a fatal but perfectly natural and intelligible mistake on the part of the most

renowned Englishman of his day. Upon the shoulders of Lord Chatham, despite his sympathy with American sentiment and his eagerness to meet American demands, rests no small share of the responsibility for the loss of the colonies. For Chatham had made a great error in diplomacy, the most serious mistake committed in those times. After 1763 the question arose, Shall England consider France as an enemy? Shall the old phrases about Crecy and Agincourt be still powerful to stir popular passion? The ancient causes of strife were in large measure removed. Both nations had room for expansion. A conciliatory spirit might have accomplished much. But Chatham cherished an eternal enmity against the house of Bourbon and an eternal suspicion of its designs. To the end his commanding influence was actively opposed to reconciliation.

In what way did France assist America? For two years before the date of the former alliance French money, arms, and equipment had sustained the sinking cause. The patriotism and organizing genius of the great dramatist Beaumarchais helped to supply the colonists with those essentials of war which the futile Congress was unable or unwilling to provide. After the alliance was concluded, the co-operation of French officers and men, and above all of the French fleet, won the day. The decisive question of the war, as of every war, was one of strategy. It was not Washington's ethical qualities, though without them there would have been no American fighting force for the French to join. In 1781 the English army under Cornwallis was shut up in Yorktown at the entrance of Chesapeake Bay, and besieged by Washington and Rochambeau. All depended upon succour by sea. The English fleet under Graves attacked the French fleet under De Grasse; and after

five days' fighting and manœuvring outside the bay, Graves retired to New York, leaving Yorktown to its fate.¹ Such, then, was the decisive and, until lately, little understood battle off Cape Henry. The war had become an international war. Great Britain had to face not merely her revolted colonies, but France, Spain, Holland, and the armed neutrality of the Baltic powers; while the British sea-power, despite its unequalled strength, was yet insufficient to cope with the combined navies of Europe. No one state or ruler of modern times has yet proved able to defy Europe—Louis XIV failed, the transcendent genius of Napoleon failed. William II of Germany has failed, so did George III. To this cause then, and not to the efforts of Franklin or Jefferson or even of Washington, the independence of the United States was due.

You will, naturally, as Americans be inclined to query, If such and (as I fain would hope) so convincing a defence can be set up on behalf of the home government, how comes it that posterity, by a general consensus of opinion, has declared itself upon the side of the colonists? An Englishman may, perhaps, be permitted to call attention to the fact that agreement is not so general as Americans have long been taught to believe. In England, for example, the great Conservative party has never admitted the justice of the colonial claim. Already in these lectures an attempt has been made to explain the origin and permanence of the trans-Atlantic point of view. But other considerations of equal force and perhaps of wider range readily suggest themselves. In Britain, for example, the Whig party, advocate of Parliamentary Reform, did not cease for generations to fortify itself by repeating

¹ It is only fair to say that upon Hood and not Graves rests the blame for this result.

American formulas and pointing to American success. It is, moreover, scarcely possible to over-emphasize the historic sanction of victory. Clio lingers long before she confers upon the champions of a beaten side their due meed of merit. To this cause above and beyond all others we must attribute the lamentable fact that seven generations elapsed ere the grand figure of Oliver Cromwell emerged from the mists of party and of prejudice and became for the first time susceptible of a true measure and interpretation. Even Edmund Burke, endowed with a clearer political vision than any of his contemporaries, was on one occasion so far misled by prejudice founded upon traditional misrepresentation as to insult the memory of the English Protector. 'One of the great bad men of the old stamp', so Burke described a statesman with whose political philosophy he had himself very much in common. In Great Britain, moreover, the transcendent oratory of Chatham and Burke has conferred undying lustre upon the side which they espoused. Posterity has forgotten, or was never acquainted with, the precise nature of the advocates' plea, its reserves, its qualifications; but the purple patches, the splendour of the rhetoric, the happy illustration, the invective, the sarcasm, the wit, the wisdom, have become part of the parliamentary immortalities. For one man who knows that both Chatham and Burke were agreed upon the vital necessity of maintaining the Union a hundred have read the praise bestowed by Pitt upon the Congress of Philadelphia, or the lofty eloquence with which he denounced the employment of German and Indian auxiliaries. Every student of political history, every lover of letters continues to admire the point and brilliancy of Burke's portraits of Grenville, of Chatham, of Townshend; the glow of poetic imagination revealed in the famous passage

concerning the angel and Lord Bathurst; the noble vindication of the spirit of freedom; the wisdom far transcending any particular circumstance or occasion with which the great statesman-philosopher set forth the true nature of imperial government; the learning and happy facility with which he pressed into his service for the illustration and adornment of his theme passages drawn sometimes from the Bible, sometimes from poets, historians, philosophers, ancient or modern, whose words not seldom shine with brilliance intensified in their new setting, and thus enable the orator to refund with generous interest his borrowed treasure. Such utterances as these have influenced profoundly the mental attitude of men and women of a later day on either side the sea. For to read the speeches of Burke and Chatham is to read the American case transfigured by the glory of words. It is the fashion nowadays to decry oratory, but its effect for good or ill, and more especially upon democracies, has been enormous and, indeed, epoch-making. Spiritually America owed, and still owes, as deep a debt to the speeches of Burke and Chatham as the Union owed to the great orations of Daniel Webster.

So much for the historic struggle which preceded the founding of your republic. Of the actual framing of the Constitution, of that wonderful document which has been styled with some pardonable exaggeration 'the Iliad, or Parthenon, or Fifth Symphony of Statesmanship' I need say little. Its real meaning, and the aims and character of its founders, were long misinterpreted in Great Britain. Had England, and especially the Conservative party in England, perceived the fact that more law-abiding men, men imbued with a more profound reverence for the past, truer lovers of ordered freedom, than Washington and Hamilton and their fellow-workers

never existed, resentment and suspicion might early have given place to sympathy and good will. The wisdom and prescience of the Fathers have stood the test of four generations. The bitter experience of many turbulent years had taught Washington that 'a commonwealth armed with dominion and competent to enforce it is the essential condition of freedom'. He and his fellows showed for the first time in history how a democracy might become permanent. Rousseau in a rare moment of divergence into historic accuracy once said that 'the people always means well but it does not always judge well'. This was a consideration ever present to the minds of the founders of the American Constitution.

To make the multitude supreme was a great experiment; and, on such a scale, a wholly new experiment. How could it be done with safety? For of all tyrannies the tyranny of the masses is likely to be the most unfair in its operations as it is the most difficult to remedy. If stability was to be secured, if property was to be safeguarded, if the sanctity of contract was to be maintained and the rights of minorities upheld, if, in short, to use the modern term, there was to be 'a square deal', adequate checks must be devised against the hasty and ill-considered and selfish action of the numerically predominant section of the community.

What these checks were and how successful they have been there is no need for me to inform you. It is, indeed, possible to think that the rigidity of your Constitution is too great, although, as President Wilson has pointed out in his *Congressional Government*, it is more susceptible to amendment in practice than on paper. Of all free democracies you are the most conservative; and that not merely in Constitutional matters. You have, it is true, banished the name and

forms of monarchy, but your President, while he is President, preserves many of George III's prerogatives. You are, as Lord Bryce has not failed to note, much less republican than England in many realms of political, social, educational, and industrial life. We, for example, have no such autocratic municipal or party bosses, magnates of the railroad or of finance, no heads of colleges or of universities endowed with such dictatorial powers. I am not criticizing these arrangements ; I merely remind you of their existence.

But this is somewhat of a digression, and I take leave of the subject of your Constitution, that miracle of human wisdom so often and so greatly misunderstood by Britain in the past, with this one word of appreciation, if you will so far forgive my boldness. That this noble document of 1787 should ever have been framed at all is astounding ; that it should successfully have been carried into practice is still more astounding. Any one who knows the lengths to which national passion will carry a people would have expected a violent reaction against English models of legislation and of political practice ; any one who knows to what extreme lengths ignorance and inexperience and class interest are apt to carry an impulsive and uninstructed democracy can only contemplate with wonder the wisdom which dictated the action and the caution which guided the feet of the founders of your great republic.

After Washington had been elected President he continued to display the same pre-eminent gifts of caution and wisdom not merely in the province of domestic statesmanship but in no less a degree in his policy towards Great Britain. For many disputed questions were left unsettled by the Treaty of 1783, which ended the War of Independence. Some of them,

indeed, resembled the poor; they seemed likely to be always with us. The discussion on the boundaries of Canada, for example, did not close till 1903—120 years after it began. From the very day of the signing of the treaty there has seldom been a period when friction did not exist. Moreover, personal politeness on either side was sadly to seek. Soft answers did not turn away wrath. Americans complained bitterly of British haughtiness. The British took umbrage at what they styled American bumptiousness. Perhaps both sides might now admit, without loss of dignity or departure from truth, that in respect of rudeness honours were easy.

But no suspicion of pettiness or meanness in sentiment or expression rests upon the memory of Washington. His conduct in every respect was such as became not only a wise and prescient statesman but the dignified head of a state young indeed in years but in the very van of civilization. From the first he perceived that there were two sides to the questions in dispute. The American Congress, during the critical period which intervened between the Declaration of Independence and the framing of the Constitution, possessed no real coercive power. As against individual states, it was impotent. It found itself, therefore, unable, perhaps unwilling, to fulfil its promise of compensation to colonial loyalists who had lost lands and possessions by the event of the war.

In their turn the British Government not unnaturally declined to evacuate posts occupied in American territory. And it is worth while to remark that George Washington, at any rate, in contrast to many of his contemporaries and successors, fully recognized the logic of the British action: 'Had we observed good faith we might have told our tale to the world with a good face, but com-

plaints ill become those who are found to be the first aggressors!’ Never were the predominant characteristics of this admirably balanced man, the spirit of conciliation, of moderation, which guided his public action, more clearly displayed, never was his authority put to a severer test than when he determined in 1794 to make a treaty with Great Britain. By the terms of the Treaty of Alliance the United States had guaranteed to France her West Indian possessions, and had promised to aid in their defence; but in 1793 at the outbreak of the revolutionary war a British Order in Council directed the seizure of all vessels carrying provisions to the French West Indies or carrying away the products of these colonies. It was a harsh Act, enforced with harshness, and, so far as I understand, without warning. Hundreds of ships were seized and their cargoes confiscated. But some American writers, Senator Lodge, for example, in his admirable *Life of Washington*, permit a justifiable indignation to cloud their historic judgement: ‘The object of the Order’, states Mr. Lodge, ‘was to destroy all neutral trade, and it was aimed particularly at the commerce of the United States.’ Mr. Lodge is not at pains to qualify this statement. Dr. Channing of Harvard, in the monumental *History* which he is now writing, is much less Chauvinist, and, I would submit, much more accurate. He is careful to note that the British Government took action in the expectation that America would fulfil her treaty obligations to France. Furthermore, he states that as a make-weight the ports of Jamaica were thrown open to American trade, and were kept open for years; that although the Americans suffered great losses they also made great gains. This statement is fair: it is recognized as fair in Great Britain; and it illustrates a method of

treatment almost invariably adopted by modern American historians. Under the circumstances I have described, Washington sent over to England Chief Justice John Jay, a wise choice, for Washington was an admirable judge of men. Jay met with an entirely friendly reception on this side the water. He was said to have so far conformed to British custom as to have kissed the queen's hand, a proceeding for which, so the irreconcilables of America declared, 'his lips ought to have been blistered to the bone'. Nowhere during the last hundred years has the study of anatomy made more rapid advances than in the United States!

Whatever his methods of diplomacy Jay was successful in his mission. An amicable and fair settlement was speedily arrived at. But no terms would satisfy the extremists. Not only Jay but the President himself was fiercely and virulently assailed. Your Ambassador Mr. Davis, in an amusing speech a few months ago, recalled the classic character of the posters put up in the streets: 'Damn John Jay, damn everyone who won't damn John Jay, damn everyone who won't put lights in his windows and sit up all night damning John Jay.'

Great Britain was, as Dr. Channing declares, 'anxious to secure a ratification of the treaty'. So, of course, was Washington. But the fate of the treaty was long in doubt. Fisher Ames, in a famous speech, mercilessly exposed the real sentiments of those who opposed the treaty. 'The opposition', he declared, 'was not to this treaty but to any treaty with Great Britain. None should be made, they said, with a monarch or a despot: there would be no naval security while this sea robber domineered over the ocean. It has been said the world ought to rejoice if Britain was sunk in the sea.' Never was Washington's unequalled influence put to so

severe a test. In the end he won, but he only just won. It is permissible to emphasize the fact that the men whom you and we alike regard as the chief ornaments of your early history, the founders of your State—Washington, Hamilton, and, in his later years, Jefferson—were each and all most desirous to promote a friendly feeling with Great Britain. ‘There is not a people on earth’, said Jefferson, ‘with whom I would sacrifice so much to be in friendship.’

But the ink was scarcely dry on the parchment of the treaty ere the ancient and, to some extent, still unsettled grounds of strife were reinforced by new. It was the epoch of the Napoleonic wars. France and England each instituted measures of blockade. Napoleon’s superiority on land was such that blockade remained our chief and wellnigh our only weapon. Upon our ancient policy events of recent date have cast a new and vivid light. The circumstances of a hundred years ago have been repeated. Germany, like Napoleon, sought universal dominion. Once more the sea power of England blocked the way. For years the English navy had prevented any direct carrying trade between France and her West Indian colonies. But what France could not do had been done by the ever-increasing merchant fleet of the United States. ‘In two years’ time almost the whole carrying trade of Europe was in American hands.’¹ By the ingenious device of transshipment America carried the products of the Indies to France and Holland. It was now that Britain declared her ‘paper’ blockade and refused any longer to recognize a break of voyage which was merely colourable. Britain regarded herself as the champion of the independence

¹ *v.* Mr. J. A. R. Marriott’s article in the *Edinburgh Review* for April 1919.

of nations, and not unnaturally resented the efforts of a neutral whom British blood and treasure, and these alone, saved from attack, to trade with the enemy, to carry supplies to a place besieged. It can scarcely be disputed that the subjugation of the United States would have been the immediate consequence of Napoleon's victory. This conviction was shared by the wisest Americans of that day. At the present day it is frankly admitted by American historians. Jefferson's eyes were fully open to America's danger. We find him writing in the summer of 1803: 'We see with great concern the position in which Great Britain is placed, and should be sincerely afflicted were any disaster to deprive mankind of the benefit of such a bulwark against the torrent which has for some time been bearing down all before it.' Dr. Channing, when speaking of the early years of the nineteenth century, describes them as a time when 'the fate of humanity was hanging in the balance, when it depended on Great Britain's resistance to the all-embracing ambitions of the conquering Corsican'.

Moreover, the loss sustained by America at the hands of the French was every whit as great as that which she suffered from Great Britain. But it has to be remembered that America, the whole-hearted hater of England, was a grateful worshipper at the shrine of France. From the one source an injury could be patiently endured; it was an insult if it came from the other.¹

There was, however, a second and more defensible cause of complaint against England: I mean the search of American vessels and the impressment of all deserters from the British navy. England treated her seamen badly. Hence the mutinies at Spithead and at the Nore.

¹ For the late Admiral Mahan's view, *v.* his *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*, pp. 249, 250.

Our seamen were apt to desert wholesale when they reached American ports ; though it should be said that many sailors were seduced from the English service and formed a considerable percentage of the crews of the American marine. We maintained the doctrine of inalienable allegiance, although this generally accepted theory was inconsistent with much of our previous action. The Americans denied the right of search ; they resented the offensive manner of the British officers who conducted the search, they claimed recognition for their own papers of naturalization. It must, however, be said that until the last moment the question of impressment had not been put forward as a ground of war. It was the Orders in Council, the measures of blockade, against which the Americans had vainly protested for six years. These Orders were reluctantly withdrawn by England five days after the States declared war, but before the news of the declaration had reached London. Had an Atlantic cable been in existence at that time it is possible that there would have been no Anglo-American War of 1812-14. I use the term 'possible', for hostilities had scarcely begun before the American Government was fully aware of the British concession. But that Government insisted on the prosecution of the war. This ill-advised and most regrettable action was due not to the opinion of the older colonies, not to pressure from New England whose commerce was chiefly involved. The New England states, indeed, were always opposed to the war. They were on the very verge of secession at the moment of the conclusion of peace. No : the outbreak of hostilities was in the main the work of the large and growing body of settlers who had crossed the Alleghanies. The quarrelsome disposition of these pioneers, fed by a diet

of salt pork and whisky, and stimulated by frontier wars, was unrestrained by any salutary dread of commercial loss, or by any tincture of that British tradition and sentiment which still lingered in Boston. Moreover, the planters of the South, from whose ranks the pioneers were chiefly drawn, had their own peculiar grievance against Britain by reason of her refusal to surrender fugitive slaves who had taken refuge under her flag. Henry Clay put himself at the head of these men of the west—the ‘war-hawks’, as they were styled—and they it was, under their fiery and fascinating leader and his youthful colleagues, who forced their Government to declare war. Lest you doubt the accuracy of my statement let me as usual place in the witness-box an American authority. ‘The ambitious young leaders of the Democratic party were spoiling for a fight’, says Gay in his *Life of Madison*, ‘and they chose to have it out with England rather than with France.’ How unnecessary, how foolish and criminal was this war, this recrudescence of armed conflict between brethren, may be inferred from the fact that by the Peace which closed a period of two years of inglorious hostilities, no question in dispute was settled, neither side surrendered anything!

Mutual passion bitter and envenomed, the antipathies of one generation passed on to another, such was the result and the entire result of the War of 1812. An Englishman can only rejoice, the whole civilized world must gratefully rejoice, that when during the first months of the Great War the same issues once again presented themselves before the same nations, a more enlightened understanding of the situation, a spirit of conciliation and of justice prevailed against Chauvinist or Pacifist bias and against hyphenated treason.

Since the time of Napoleon the two great English-speaking nations have carried on innumerable disputes about things great and things small, but they have never stood closer to the brink of a fratricidal war than during the crowded and critical years from 1861 to 1865. And before I add a single word upon this subject let me say that I yield to none of you in admiration for the indomitable whites of the South, and particularly for the many noble and lovable qualities which distinguished their leaders. The simplicity, the gentleness, the purity of that great Christian gentleman Robert Lee were on a par with his military genius; and his military genius has seldom been surpassed in ancient or in modern times.

It was extremely doubtful, and that for some years, whether England would or would not throw her weight into the scale on the side of the South. When Lincoln's policy of blockade was begun in April of 1861 it was certain to produce friction with foreign Powers. For one of America's bitterest complaints against England in 1812, a leading factor in bringing about the war of that time, was precisely this—that we had declared a blockade against France which we had not power to enforce, and therefore, contended America, when we interfered with neutral commerce we were going beyond our rights. But now, when the North declared its blockade of the South it had only forty-two ships in commission to make the blockade effective along 3,500 miles of coast.

It was not likely that the nations of Western Europe would quietly acquiesce in the Northern declaration. From the first the situation was difficult, and there would appear to be no doubt at all that but for the efforts of individual men in the mother country—Prince Albert,

the Duke of Argyll, Goldwin Smith, and in particular the leaders of that school of politics which it is now the fashion to decry, I mean the Manchester school—England would have become involved on the side of the South.

For the fact that this appalling disaster did not occur, that we were saved from a deplorable loss of blood and treasure and an undying legacy of hate, we owe a debt of gratitude first and foremost to the memory of John Bright. He it was who more clearly than any man on this side of the Atlantic perceived the true issues from the very beginning, and gave expression to his opinions and his feelings with unsurpassed eloquence and courage. The blockade question was alone sufficient to fan into a flame the embers of ancient strife, but there existed other and cogent reasons for England's sympathies with the South. Free Traders in England could not forget that the North stood broadly for Protection, and the South for a system of unshackled exchange. Cobden shared the misgivings of many of his friends until converted by Bright's influence and persuasion. But Bright in his letters to the prominent Northern statesman Charles Sumner, which were read to Lincoln and Seward, and frequently to Lincoln's Cabinet, did not disguise his Free Trade views, and frankly told the Northern Government that their 'foolish tariff' was the cause of such feeling against them as existed among the English middle classes.

Then, too, there was a distinctly 'Liberal' feeling enlisted on behalf of the South. Grote, Gladstone, and Acton felt much sympathy with the state-rights theory and with the claim to secede from a secession. It is interesting to note that many politicians who held this view were to be found among Gladstone's supporters

when he first introduced his measures of Home Rule for Ireland; and that practically all the prominent sympathizers with the North, such as Bright himself, the Duke of Argyll, and Goldwin Smith took the Unionist side.

The Conservative classes were, with the great exception of Disraeli, overwhelmingly on the side of the South. For they feared the triumph of Democracy and the effect it would have upon politics in Great Britain. The London Press with few exceptions leaned to the side of the South. 'Four years of *The Times* leading articles', says Mr. Rhodes, the American historian of the Civil War, 'irritated Americans more than any speech of Palmerston, any dispatch of Russell, or any violation of Great Britain's neutrality.'

Fortunately the heart of England was sound. The cotton operatives, owing to the Northern blockade, were thrown out of work. There was great distress, but to the eternal honour of the factory-workers of that day, though the mills closed down, including the great firm at Rochdale of which Bright was the head, every one, employers and employed, remained staunch. There was no disturbance, no rioting. The behaviour of South Lancashire was as exemplary as its courage was admirable and its judgement sound. I need not remind you that Abraham Lincoln expressed his gratitude to the Lancashire operatives in one of the most beautiful of all his letters.

During the four years of war English opinion veered first in one direction and then in the other, but with a growing sympathy for the North as the struggle identified itself more closely with the question of slavery. It is to the great honour of John Bright in particular that despite every sort of temptation, he a cotton manu-

facturer, a Free Trader, a Quaker, never permitted either personal interest or cherished conviction, religious or economic, to blind his eyes to the true issues. He, the most famous champion of Peace whom the nineteenth century produced, wrote to Sumner after the initial Northern defeat at Bull Run, 'I dread the results of the war . . . but I can find no way of escape. The devil of slavery has been cherished and now threatens to destroy you; if he is to be driven out, as in old time, he will tear and rend you. Whatever is done and whatsoever comes, I need not tell you that I am for the Government which was founded by your great men of eighty years ago, and that all my sympathies and hopes are with those who are for freedom.' This was his attitude throughout the war. Bright's peace formulas went by the board in the presence of issues more important than peace. 'I fear to hear of any surrender on the part of the South at present, fearing that men would be so glad to have peace that they would admit the Slave States again in their fellowship, and that twenty years hence you might find the old disturber still present with you. . . . When you come to negotiate, that will be the time of real danger.' And again, he writes to Villiers: 'I want no end of the war, and no compromise and no reunion till the negro is made free beyond all chance of failure.'

The moment of gravest peril to the peaceable relations between England and the North was at Christmas of 1861 when two Southern Commissioners, Mason and Slidell, on their voyage to England were forcibly taken from an English ship by the captain of a Northern cruiser. We demanded the release of the two men in accordance with international law. Fortunately Lord John Russell the Foreign Minister was diplomatic enough so to frame his demands that the North was able to

accept them without loss of dignity. But the issue was long in the balance. 'At all hazards', wrote Bright to Sumner, 'you must not let this matter grow to a war with England, even if you are right and we are wrong. I implore you . . . not to play the game of every enemy of your country. Nations in great crises and difficulties have often done that which in their prosperous and powerful hour they would not have done, and they have done it without humiliation or disgrace.' After long and doubtful debate, Lincoln's Cabinet decided to give up Mason and Slidell. It seems certain that this happy issue was due in no small measure to the President's wise and restraining influence.

When the *Alabama*, commissioned by the South, was built in the Mersey, and by inadvertence allowed to sail in July of 1862, another crisis arose. This famous vessel was no sooner at sea than she hoisted the Southern flag, and shortly began to prey on the commerce of the North. Of course much friction arose, in respect not only of the *Alabama* but of the whole system of blockade. Early in the war Lincoln, by a most happy interference, by a masterly alteration in the verbal form of one of Seward's dispatches, had changed a crude and provocative into a firm but courteous document. It is quite possible that these 'few pen-strokes' prevented war. So now in the *Alabama* difficulty, though much credit is due to the diplomats, Lincoln's influence was once more exercised on the side of peace. 'Tell the English people I mean them no harm.' From this side of the water Bright wrote to Sumner with words of warning. 'Irritation is inevitable, from the legal and necessary conduct of your war-vessels, but the greatest care should be taken to use their powers, even their legal powers, with the greatest moderation. Whether

a ship more or less breaks the blockade is of no real importance to you, or to us, but whether you should be interfered with in your efforts to suppress the Southern insurrection by a war with England, is of importance to you and us that words cannot describe.' Then fortunately the tide of war turned, and the voices of the peacemakers were strengthened. That there was no war between England and the North, that this awful calamity was averted, is due first and foremost to the unceasing effort, the courage, wisdom, and good will of Lincoln on one side and Bright on the other.

But all this regrettable *Alabama* business did not end with the Civil War. America did not cease to claim reparation for damages. The feelings of the North were still embittered by the open expression of English sympathy for the Southern cause. In 1869 fuel was added to the flames by the almost unanimous refusal of the American Senate to ratify a draft Treaty of Arbitration. Moreover, the impulsive and tactless Sumner as Chairman of the Senatorial Committee on Foreign Affairs, not content with the certainty of a triumphant vote, must needs make a speech full of preposterous charges against Britain. She it was, so Sumner asserted, who by the encouragement she gave the South had added years of costly sacrifice to the civil strife. He charged against Great Britain, therefore, half the expenses of the whole war in addition to the enormous sums quoted for individual and national losses to property and commerce. In respect of all this hysterical rodomontade I need only quote the sober and enlightened opinion of a great American historian: 'Of all the outrageous claims', said James Ford Rhodes, 'of which our diplomatic annals are full, I can call to mind none more so than this.' It is a curious illustration of Sumner's psychological

blindness that he honestly thought he had made a speech 'kindly and pacific in tone'. Charles Francis Adams, the real hero of the *Alabama* Arbitration, surpassed by no American in knowledge and understanding of this question, was not slow to condemn Sumner's utterance: 'Its practical effect is to raise the scale of our demands for reparation so very high that there is no chance of negotiation left, unless the English have lost all their spirit and character.' John Bright, the closest friend America had in England, denounced Sumner in vigorous style, and declared in conversation with Senator Grimes that 'Sumner was either a fool himself or else thought the English public and their public men to be fools'. Sumner's idea was in reality this—and nothing less than this—the annexation by the United States of Canada and British America by way of settlement of account. Sumner desired peaceful annexation but other senators were more bellicose. 'If Great Britain', said Senator Chandler, 'should meet us in a friendly spirit, acknowledge her wrong and cede all her interests in the Canadas in settlement of these claims, we will have perpetual peace with her; but if she does not we must conquer peace. We cannot afford to have an enemy's base so near us. It is a national necessity that we should have the British possessions.' President Grant sympathized with this view. He was in favour of expansion. He had no doubt as to the result of a war with England: 'Sheridan could have taken Canada in thirty days!'

But other American statesmen—and pre-eminently Grant's courageous Secretary of State, Mr. Hamilton Fish—fortunately held more pacific and wiser views. 'The two English-speaking progressive liberal governments of the world, should not, must not, be divided. . . . I believe Great Britain is great enough to be just.

Mr. Bright thinks she was drawn into error. So do we. If she can be brought to think so, it will not be necessary for her to say so, at least not very loudly.' Nevertheless, even Mr. Fish urged the withdrawal of Great Britain from Canada. 'The President', wrote Fish to the British Minister at Washington, 'evidently expects these provinces to be annexed to the United States during his administration. I hope that it may be so.' England was apparently ready to let Canada go. But Canada herself was the difficulty. She did not wish it, she *does* not wish it. She deliberately preferred the government of Great Britain to that of the United States. Meanwhile, friendly and peaceful diplomatic influences were at work on both sides of the Atlantic, and eventually, in accordance with the provisions of a treaty concluded at Washington, it was decided to refer the *Alabama* claims to a tribunal of arbitration. There were to be five arbitrators, one each to be appointed by the United States, England, Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. The meeting-place was Geneva. The British representative was Chief Justice Cockburn; the American Charles Francis Adams. Of course each case was presented by counsel. 'The document entitled "The case of the United States" is not one for an American to be proud of', so writes an American historian. And, indeed, it does seem obvious that in pleading the personal unfriendliness of the English upper classes and the permitted violations of British neutrality as so many reasons why Great Britain should be called upon to reimburse the United States of America for all expenses of the war after the date of the battle of Gettysburg American counsel fairly 'out-Sumnered Sumner'. Claims so preposterous and unjust roused deep indignation in Great Britain. Some members of Gladstone's ministry

wished to withdraw from the arbitration, but the strenuous efforts of Forster, Ripon, and Granville were happily successful in saving the threatened treaty. The crux of the matter lay in this: England desired the withdrawal of the preposterous 'indirect claims'. American Anglophobia long stood in the way. It was now that the tact and magnanimity of Adams, and, an Englishman may add, his sense of justice too, frankly gave up all claims for indirect damages, and the arbitrators as a body declared that these claims should be wholly excluded from the consideration of the tribunal. The damages paid by England were regarded in those economical days as heavy, £3,000,000, but they were not to be weighed in the scale with what was nothing less than an historic achievement fraught with immense issues, unforeseen, perhaps undreamt of, by any man, even the most prescient, at that hour—the amicable and dignified adjustment, for the first time in the modern world as between two great nations, of a difference so perilous and apparently so insurmountable. If we want to realize the genuine and far-reaching import of what occurred at Geneva, let us simply ask ourselves, What would be happening in the world at this moment had the arbitration failed?

Despite this great triumph of the principle of arbitration, the secular bitterness between our two countries by no means entirely subsided. For Americans, and especially for Western Americans, and more especially for American youth, Britain yet remained a kind of isolated bug-bear, still the only European foe your nation had encountered in arms. We were still suspected, still misunderstood. But, on both sides of the water, there were many and strong forces working, consciously or unconsciously, for peace and reconciliation. Prejudices

were already breaking down under the dissolvent of a continually increasing commercial and social intercourse, when James Bryce's epoch-making volumes more than undid the mischief done by the genius of Dickens. For such books as *Martin Chuzzlewit* and *American Notes*, however great their literary merits, had assuredly not promoted international friendship.

It was fortunate, indeed, that hostility had grown less active when in the year 1895 there came another and grave crisis in the diplomatic relations between America and England. For the Monroe doctrine had been, if not deliberately defied, at least deliberately ignored. I am not about to attempt any elaborate exposition of the Monroe doctrine, still less to trace its history. I need only remind you that the famous Presidential message of 1823 was suggested in the first instance by one of the greatest Foreign Secretaries Britain has ever had—the versatile, the dazzling, the perennially young George Canning. The principles of the Holy Alliance—the League of Nations of that day—had unfortunately become identified with the interests of autocracy. Upon Britain alone of all the great European Powers devolved the championship of freedom. There was a definite design on the part of France to take over the Spanish South-American colonies. It was obvious that such a scheme, if consummated, would not only have added enormously to the extent and material resources of the French Dominion, but also to the power and prestige of the autocratic system. At this crisis Canning endeavoured to enlist the sympathies of the United States. Many circumstances combined to aid him. The United States happened to be engaged at that precise moment in a somewhat sharp dispute with Russia, a prominent member of the Holy Alliance. Moreover, the great

founders of the Republic had ever advocated a complete separation from the complicated struggles and the reactionary politics of the Old World. President Monroe, or to be more strictly correct his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the real framer of the Monroe doctrine, inherited their policy and followed in their steps. Neither they nor he wished to interfere in Europe; and now by this new declaration European states and autocracies were warned that they must not seek to extend their territories or their system upon the American continent.

Non-interference in Europe, and 'America for the Americans', this is the sum and substance of the Monroe doctrine in its original form. But it is incumbent upon every responsible citizen nowadays to inquire what, if any, deeper meaning underlies the doctrine; and how far it is possible, with due regard to international justice, to uphold such a doctrine in practice. The late John Hay, Lincoln's private secretary and biographer, and himself for seven years Secretary of State, once said of his policy that the Monroe doctrine and the Golden Rule were a sufficient basis of action. Apparently he saw no contradiction between these two principles. It would seem that in America the Monroe doctrine has always commended itself not merely to the popular imagination but to the considered judgement of statesmen.¹ It expresses and it safeguards one of their most treasured ideals—the right of free peoples to decide their own destinies. It is true there were countries on the American continent governed in accordance with principles which the leading western republic did not approve. To such principles and institutions the attitude of the United States was very much that of Lincoln towards

¹ v. Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, p. 97.

slavery. They were willing to respect them, but would not consent to their extension. Not only was the United States the 'land of liberty but the Protector of liberty'. Her citizens would make of all their continent the home of Freedom.

Of course selfish considerations were not absent from their minds. Altruism is seldom unmixed with alloy. The United States does not want any powerful neighbours. She has long realized, moreover, that it is to her advantage for commercial reasons to keep all the western hemisphere within her sphere of influence. Enlightened self-interest, therefore, walks hand in hand with an honest enthusiasm for ideals. So much may be inferred from the admitted fact that the United States, despite the emphasis placed by the Monroe doctrine as originally framed upon the difference between the American and the European principles of government, would have offered as strenuous a resistance to any encroachment by the Republican Government of France, or by free and liberty-loving England, as she would have done to imperial or autocratic aggression. However this may be, the Monroe doctrine speedily became an accepted creed in the country of its origin. But elsewhere for two generations it was almost forgotten. Neither Europe in general nor Great Britain in particular perceived its ultimate meaning and the hold which it had upon the American people until the year 1895. Then suddenly in the second administration of Grover Cleveland a new and dramatic development of American policy revealed with startling suddenness to the whole world the real significance of this treasured and traditional dogma.

Some features of Mr. Cleveland's policy had laid him open to a charge of subserviency to England. His

critics, indeed, began to describe him by that most withering of all adjectives 'Un-American'. Despite, therefore, the fact that in two successive years the Presidential message to Congress had expressed a hope that the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela should speedily be adjusted, no one dreamt of the dramatic developments that were presently to follow. The quarrel was of ancient date. It concerned the delimitation of Venezuela and British Guiana. From 1841 onwards Venezuela protested against our claims. American writers made much capital out of the fact that Britain's replies had been few and contemptuous. Lord Salisbury retorted that the claims of Venezuela were without basis, and the governments of that state so unstable as to make negotiations useless. But in 1876 Venezuela definitely invited the United States Government to 'see justice done'. For an important event had occurred. Rich gold deposits had been found in the disputed territory. Settlers and miners flocked into the debatable district. Our Government, moreover, for obvious reasons declined the offer of the United States to arbitrate.

Such was the situation in 1893 when President Cleveland's second term of office began. In American eyes the thing began to wear an ugly look. It had the appearance of an arbitrary insistence by virtue of force confirmed by settlement of a claim which was at best of doubtful legality. This, in the opinion of Cleveland's Government, was an example of flagrant injustice. Of course the United States had in every respect behaved incomparably worse, at least if we are to believe many of your own most high-minded statesmen and most accomplished men of letters, when she doubled her territory by the annexations of 1848. But the ethical

action of no civilized state has been consistent. If the United States were guilty of a national wrong in 1848 it by no means follows that they were not single-minded champions of justice fifty years later. Whatever Lord Salisbury's tactlessness, or the injustice of Britain's case, and the findings of the United States Commission supported the British contentions almost in their entirety, it must be said that the language of the American Secretary of State was in harmony with the last part only of Theodore Roosevelt's advice—'Speak softly and carry a big stick.' 'To-day', wrote Mr. Olney, 'the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized State, not because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resource combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other Powers.' There is a story with which I expect you are well acquainted how some years after the happy termination of the Venezuelan dispute an intimate friend of Mr. Cleveland was asked how the President felt when he read Lord Salisbury's dispatches declining to recognize the Monroe doctrine or the right of one nation to impose a particular procedure upon two others. 'Felt!' was the reply, 'why he felt mad clear through.' But I put it to you as fair-minded men. Is it not possible that when Lord Salisbury read Mr. Olney's declaration he also 'felt mad clear through', though there is no historic record of the fact? Whatever he felt, he spoke and acted with punctilious

politeness. The great majority of people in England, ill-informed in respect of the Monroe doctrine and Venezuelan question alike, were slow to appreciate the gravity of the situation, were at first inclined to regard the whole dispute as a mere move on the chess-board of American party politics. The inherent good will never wholly eradicated, the unquenchable gaiety, the well-balanced humour of the two English-speaking peoples, found expression in the bantering messages exchanged by the stockbrokers of London and New York. The allusion, of course, is to the International yacht races for the America Cup. 'When our warships enter New York harbour we hope that your excursion boats will not interfere with them' was the message sent from London. The veiled irony of this message is obvious, but, nothing daunted, the New York brokers were prompt in their reply. 'For your sake', they cabled, 'it is to be hoped that your warships are better than your yachts.'

But the full text of the President's message to Congress at once enlightened and amazed the British public. They regarded with horror the mere thought of war with a kindred nation, and, says an American critic, 'Fortunately for us the British Prime Minister had a very good sense of humour and declined to take the matter too seriously'.¹

I will not pursue the story in detail. By the courteous consent of England as well as of Venezuela, the American commissioners were afforded every possible facility for investigation. Lord Salisbury, in response to a suggestion by the American Ambassador, 'empowered Sir Julian Pauncefote to discuss the question either with the representative of Venezuela or with the

¹ Mr. J. A. R. Marriott's article in the *Edinburgh Review*, April 1919.

Government of the United States acting as the friend of Venezuela'. Thus he conceded the whole question at issue. The negotiators made their award. It was accepted by both parties and the incident closed. But the United States had gained a great and far-reaching diplomatic triumph. The principle of the Monroe doctrine had been unreservedly accepted by Great Britain—the only European Power which up to that time had kept up a close and continuous contact, territorial and commercial, with the great American Republic.

Since 1895 the Monroe doctrine with its almost boundless elasticity and adaptability has stood clearly before the world, although at any single moment it has been difficult to define its precise scope and nature.

The war with Spain and the subsequent entrance of the United States into the group of World Powers by reason of its occupation of the Philippines and its active co-operation in the affairs of Eastern Asia has of necessity altered the American point of view. It is true President Monroe did not declare against interference in the Far East. But with what logic can a nation interfere in one continent occupied by ancient states and refrain from interference in another? or how can the States call upon Asiatic Powers to respect certain provisions of a document while the framer of that very document feels itself at liberty to transgress the compensating provisions? The fact is that logic has little to do with the principles which guide states and nations. In the past, at any rate, expediency and not logic has for the most part dictated national action. But it would seem that considerations higher than expediency have in increasing measure affected the three latest extensions of the famous doctrine. Theodore Roosevelt and Mr. Wilson have been the first

men to recognize that the Monroe doctrine had, or ought to have, a positive as well as a negative side. If it conferred rights it imposed duties. By every axiom of international justice, if the United States prohibited a European Power from protecting its own interests in the western hemisphere, it devolved upon the United States herself to safeguard its rights. Mr. Roosevelt was compelled, out of regard not only to American but to foreign interests, to take over the administration of the Republic of San Domingo, and Mr. Wilson has assumed the same responsibility in the case of Hayti.

But President Wilson during his first term of office carried the Monroe doctrine further still. His grand scheme of a Pan-American alliance—the clue to so much that was mysterious in his early Foreign Policy—was of a surety prompted not merely by the quite legitimate if selfish wish to secure for the United States the ‘limitless potentialities’ of the South American markets, but also to provide, for the equal advantage of every republic great or small in the New World, a permanent and invincible safeguard against internal dissension or external attack. It is conceivable that one of the proposals which Mr. Wilson formulated at the Pan-American Congress of 1916 may at a later date involve the League of Peace in some inconsistency. I refer to the maintenance of a Republican form of Government. What would happen if any state deliberately preferred a constitutional monarchy, I know not. But surely the supposition is not outside the realm of possibility. Mr. Wilson’s plan in this particular forcibly reminds one of a decree of 1792 by which the French revolutionaries threatened war against any nation which should dare to refuse liberty! Needless to remark no American statesman has overlooked the fact that Pan-Ameri-

canism is merely a name so long as it does not include Great Britain, one of the chief Powers on the continent of America. An alliance with Great Britain is obviously essential to the making of Pan-Americanism into a safe and working principle. These things are yet on the knees of the gods. But it may be that all other Alliances and Leagues of Peace will become superfluous if the world-wide scheme with which your President's name is so honourably associated becomes, as we pray it may speedily become, a practicable and working reality.

Here, perhaps, I may interject the remark that Mr. Wilson cannot claim, nor, so far as I am aware, has he ever dreamt of claiming, any credit for the conception of the plan which is known by the name of the League of Nations. You know that an organization styled the 'League to Enforce Peace' was founded in Philadelphia in June 1915. Long before Mr. Wilson announced his adherence to the League and long before the League was in existence Mr. Roosevelt had advocated its foundation principles with all his energy and more than his usual eloquence. But the idea of a League of Nations backed by force was no invention even of Mr. Roosevelt. It goes back further than any President of them all. Grotius had suggested it generations before the founding of the United States. The illustrious founder of the state of Pennsylvania had discussed it at length in his pamphlet on *The Peace of Europe* written in 1694. John Bright had definitely suggested its application to the affairs of the sea as well as of the land. For these two great champions of Peace were not only Quakers but practical statesmen. Their principles were not those of the Peace-at-Any-Price party. This is a notion strangely difficult to eradicate even in quarters which should be better informed.

President Wilson by his Pan-American plan proposed merely to extend and strengthen that half of the Monroe doctrine which prohibited European intervention on the American continent, but most people would have said that by the entry of the States into the Great War he had finally thrown overboard that other half which pledged America to stand aside from European politics and take no part in the complicated struggles of the Old World. This, however, is not the view of that great and patriotic idealist who is at this time more responsible than any other man for the policy of the United States. In his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, he goes so far as to say that 'in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace . . . there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment rather of all that we have professed or striven for. I am proposing as it were that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world.' Whether or not Mr. Wilson's action be an example of gross inconsistency, Englishmen at any rate are not called upon to decide; but beyond doubt the Government of the United States and President Woodrow Wilson have thereby helped to save every ideal of Western civilization; and we all of us, every individual citizen of the countries allied against Germany, can only feel, and it is our duty to express, a profound and lasting gratitude.

To one point more and one only I venture to call your attention, before I conclude. We in Great Britain acquiesce in the Monroe doctrine whether it be to some extent superseded or not by the League of Nations.

This, time alone can show. We believe that in its recent development the traditional and treasured doctrine associated with the name of Monroe has proved and is likely to prove a beneficent instrument in the preservation of world-peace. We would ask you in our turn at least to be willing to remember that the Monroe doctrine has grown and flourished under the protection of the British fleet. Theodore Roosevelt acknowledged this in no ambiguous or qualified terms. Not that you were unable to build a great fleet for the security of America and of your ideals and free institutions. But you simply did not do it. You were willing to leave the protection of Freedom in the New World, as in the Old, to the navy of Britain.

Nowadays, as formerly, our national views may not always coincide with respect to that oft-repeated and still ambiguous term, the 'Freedom of the Seas'. But you, I feel sure, cannot fail to recognize as you view the position of Great Britain, so close to possible European foes, bearing, moreover, the enormous responsibilities of a world-wide dominion, that a strong, and indeed a preponderating, fleet is as essential for her security as the Monroe doctrine is for yours.

Since the settlement of the thorny Venezuelan problem, events have drawn us more closely together:—the sympathy, for example, and something more than sympathy, which Great Britain displayed to America at the time of the war with Spain. I do not refer merely to the overt act of Captain Sir Edward Chichester in the harbour of Manila when he deliberately manœuvred his flag-ship between the American and German fleets, thereby at his own risk preventing in all human probability an open war between the States and the German Empire, but also to the thwarting by Great Britain

of an undoubted attempt on the part of certain European Powers friendly to Spain to bring about the diplomatic isolation of America. These services were known and treasured in your navy and by the Republican Party then in office, but apparently, to the profound regret of Great Britain, they were temporarily forgotten, or at any rate ignored, at the outbreak of the Great War. Then came your intervention and its consequences, and with it all trace of ancient animosities vanished from every generous British heart. We know well what America has since done: her initially somewhat slow, but constantly accelerating preparations, and finally her giant and almost unprecedented effort; her self-sacrificing chivalry displayed at the critical moment of the great German offensive in the Spring of 1918, her valour and success in the field which added 'the conquering swing' to the long work of the Allies. Whatever the future has in store these things will not fade from British hearts and minds.

And these are not all. America has deprived herself of food to send it to the starving peoples of Europe, and to the nations and armies of the Entente. She has poured forth her treasure like water. She has sealed her alliance in the blood of her sons. A quarter of a million of her men were wounded. No fewer than 60,000 have joined that deathless band—those millions of French, British, Italians, Serbs, Belgians, Russians, and Roumanians, who

shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.

If what I have said reflects the truth of History, and I believe there is scarcely an assertion made in these

lectures for which chapter and verse could not be found in the pages of your own historians, I feel sure that any assembly of genuine Americans anywhere would return one unanimous answer to the inquiry with which we set out. They would say that faults and misconceptions, few or many, small or great, on either side have not been of such a character as to divide for all time the hearts of kindred nations.

Despite the great tidal waves of immigration in recent years from Southern and Eastern Europe, America has yet, and is likely to retain throughout the ages, much in common with the British motherland. With a pride in the same historic heroes, in the same glories of literary achievement, with institutions modelled on the same traditions of freedom, with the closest sympathy in ethics, in ideals, in religious organization, what should hinder our permanent friendship? You cannot cherish an eternal enmity to the race whose blood flowed in the veins of Washington and Hamilton, Jefferson and Webster, Lincoln and Robert Lee, not to speak of so many of your poets and philosophers and novelists whose names are household words with us as with you. Some of you, perhaps, in your democratic zeal may still be inclined to echo the ancient cry and to say, 'Yes, this is all very well, but you live under, and apparently cherish, that discredited and out of date monarchic regime to whose extension on the free soil of the New World our Monroe doctrine is fundamentally opposed.' I am not cruel enough to insist on the undoubted fact that Washington was far indeed from becoming a convert to pure democracy, and that Hamilton openly regretted the necessity for establishing a Republican form of Government. But I would beg you to believe that liberty may find diverse expression, may clothe itself in varied garb.

The three most eminent friends America ever had in England were not for that reason the less attached to the forms of the Constitution under which they lived. The dying embers of Chatham's eloquence flickered into one last flame as he invoked the sentiment of national patriotism on behalf of Britain's 'ancient and most venerable monarchy'. Burke's speeches and writings, ablaze with enthusiasm for individual freedom, are none the less imbued with historic instinct in their every page and column, with loyal sentiment, with veneration for the past and for the forms of the past. Bright in texture of mind every whit as conservative as Burke or Chatham, died with a letter from his queen under his pillow expressing in gracious and grateful terms her appreciation of his long and faithful service of forty years.

Two generations have passed away since John Bright, when speaking of the supposed design of the United States to humiliate Great Britain by the seizure of Canada, ventured to formulate in the House of Commons what was at that time a somewhat daring, but perhaps for that very reason a more noteworthy, prediction—that 'notwithstanding some present irritation and some present distrust . . . these two great commonwealths will march abreast, the parents and guardians of freedom and justice, where-soever their language shall be spoken and their power shall extend'. The sentiment which inspired that noble utterance has found an ever increasing echo on both sides of the Atlantic. I need hardly remind you, for example, that the charming and accomplished John Hay, Lincoln's private secretary and biographer, strove hard when Ambassador to England to strengthen the friendship between the two great English-speaking lands. He

complains bitterly of the influences that thwarted his generous and prescient policy. 'That we should be compelled', he mourns, 'to refuse the assistance of the greatest Power in the world in carrying out our own policy because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools is enough to drive a man mad.' Such representative men as the great American writer Mr. Winston Churchill and the English statesman Joseph Chamberlain were no whit behind John Hay in their eager desire to promote national good will at least, if not a more definite and formal bond. Here is the prophetic sentence which ends that brilliant novel from which I have already quoted: 'Ere I had regained my health, the War of Independence was won. I pray God that time may soften the bitterness it caused and heal the breach in that noble race whose motto is Freedom, that the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack may one day float together to cleanse the world of tyranny.' Joseph Chamberlain in May 1898, during a speech at Birmingham, made use of these memorable words: 'What is our next duty? It is to establish and maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. . . . I don't know', he continued, 'what the future may have in store for us; I don't know what arrangements may be possible. But this I do know and feel, that the closer, the more cordial and fuller and more definite these arrangements are, with the consent of both peoples, the better will it be for us both and for the world. I will even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, war itself would be cheaply purchased if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance.' Well, gentlemen, the war foreshadowed by Mr. Churchill and

Mr. Chamberlain has come and gone. We trust that the reward may be abundant as the price has been terrible. Linked together by the bonds of mutual understanding what is there that we could not accomplish for the good of mankind? Let us pray that our alliance, sacred in its beginnings, may be written for ever, if not upon parchment yet upon material more durable than parchment—upon the minds and hearts of two great, free, and kindred peoples.

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